An ethical and legal perspective on the role of school counselors in preventing violence in schools - Special issue: legal and ethical issues in schoo

Recent, highly publicized school shootings have had a tremendous impact on the public's perception of school safety (Vossekuil, Reddy, Fein, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2000). These events have prompted school officials to consider prevention strategies for targeted violence in schools. School officials are increasingly turning to school counselors for help in identifying and providing interventions for students who may pose a danger to others (Riley & McDaniel, 2000). School counselors are meeting this challenge by providing violence prevention activities, assessing students' risk of engaging in violent behavior, and providing appropriate interventions when the potential for violence exists. This article offers school counselors an overview of their ethical obligations related to school violence and an explanation of their legal duty to protect students from harm. In order to adhere to ethical and legal dictates concerning school violence, it is necessary to be familiar with the characteristics of students who may be at risk for violent behavior and strategies for preventing school violence; thus, these topics are also discussed. This article concludes with specific recommendations for school counselors to follow as they attempt to keep violence from occurring in schools.

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Ethical Duty to Protect Students from Violence in School

There are two ethics documents that inform the practice of school counselors: the Ethical Standards for School Counselors (American School Counselor Association [ASCA], 1998) and the Code of Ethics (American Counseling Association [ACA], 1995). Ethical standards require school counselors to inform appropriate authorities when a student's behavior is indicative of clear and imminent danger to others (ACA, [section] B.1.c.; ASCA, [section] A.7.). Yet, the best means of accurately determining whether a student is potentially violent has been the subject of much scholarly debate (Bailey, 2001; Reddy et al., 2001; Vossekuil et al., 2000). Accordingly, the ethical standards recommend that school counselors consult with colleagues when working with students who may be at risk for violence (ACA, [section] B.1.c.; ASCA, [section] A.7.).

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US Supports UN Commission of Inquiry to Investigate Crimes in Burma

By Andrea Gittleman on November 5, 2010 Tweet this

Embarking on a trip through several Asian nations last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly announced the United States’ support for the establishment of a United Nations Commission of Inquiry to investigate crimes in Burma. Unofficially announced months earlier, Clinton’s affirmation of support for an international investigation reflects the demands of Physicians for Human Rights and allied organizations which have been urging states to support an impartial inquiry into crimes in Burma.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton discusses America's engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, Thursday, Oct. 28, 2010, in Honolulu, Hawaiicredit: Evan Vucci, Pool / AP Photo

Clinton’s remarks were part of a speech that largely focused on Burma’s upcoming elections, the country’s first in twenty years. United States officials and others in the international community have recognized that the elections scheduled for November 7 will be neither free nor fair. Government officials and human rights organizations from around the world have clamored for the military regime to release the approximately 2100 political prisoners and allow opposition parties to fairly contest the election. The constant crackdowns on opposition voices and political critics, however, including the recent sentencing of a monk to 15 years of hard labor for anti-election campaigning, indicate that the election will be yet another display of the regime’s disregard for international norms.

The Burmese regime, called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), designed the elections to silence opposition and keep its members and allies in power. The SPDC’s Political Parties Registration Law excludes significant numbers of opposition leaders and demands allegiance to the flawed 2008 constitution from all prospective candidates. The Election Commission, hand-picked by the junta, can cancel elections in areas deemed insecure and answers to no independent body. The Commission has already indicated that it will cancel elections in parts of Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mon, and Shan states, areas where minority ethnic groups have long opposed the military rulers.

The world should remember, however, that even if the elections were openly participatory and peaceful, significant problems would persist after the elections when the 2008 constitution is implemented. The constitution was crafted unilaterally by the regime to perpetuate military rule, ensure impunity for even the most serious of crimes, and continue abuses against political opponents and members of ethnic groups.

The constitution does not provide for true civilian rule in Burma but rather allows the military to retain ultimate control over all levels of government. The constitution affords the Commander-in-Chief of the military significant power over civilian leaders. There are no standards for approval, qualifications, or term limits for the Commander-in-Chief, as there are for other posts listed in the constitution. The Commander-in-Chief is also responsible for the Ministries of Home Affairs, Defense, and Border Affairs, and can appoint these ministers without any significant check from the President or other civilian leader. The constitution allows the Defense Services to enlist the entire population into its service in the name of national security without any check from a civilian body. This extreme control over the people of Burma is the cornerstone of a military dictatorship, not a genuine civilian government.

The constitution goes even further to make sure that the military leadership controls significant portions of the government. For example, the Commander-in-Chief of the military effectively controls the National Defense and Security Council, a body that can declare states of emergency. In such a situation, the Commander-in-Chief would assume power of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The constitution permits no governmental body or individual, even the President, to impeach the Commander-in-Chief, who answers to no one regarding the actions of the military. The Commander-in-Chief can, however, through his control of the military-appointed members of the legislature, enact impeach proceedings against the President. The Commander-in-Chief also plays a greater role in selecting the President than the President does in appointing the Commander-in-Chief.

Other articles of the constitution demonstrate the regime’s effort to continue the militarization of politics that has taken hold over the past several decades. In an effort to perpetuate the systematic gender discrimination that has thus far marked the rule of the SPDC, the constitution limits key posts to men. The constitution refers to positions that are “suitable for men only”, indicating entrenched opposition to allowing women to fully participate in political life. By requiring the President and Vice-President to be well-acquainted with the military, which is made up of men only, the constitution effectively bars women from contesting the highest offices of civilian government. These parts of the constitution ensure that men, and most likely military-aligned men, will continue to control the civilian government after the election.

Perhaps the most jarring part of the constitution is article 445, which purports to grant a blanket amnesty to all military personnel for all crimes ever committed – even acts which may amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes under the Rome Statute. Although a culture of impunity currently protects criminals from accountability, the constitution will codify impunity and render victims of heinous crimes permanently unable to seek any measure of justice through the domestic legal system.

Physicians for Human Rights’ recent research shows evidence of the SPDC’s serious crimes which include killings, acts of sexual and gender based violence, the use of child soldiers, torture, and forced labor. When the constitution is enacted following the elections, the regime will continue its history of abuse. The election will not significantly change the current leadership of Burma but instead will allow criminals to get away with their crimes and enable the abuses of today to continue well into the future. Because the constitution excludes the Burmese legal system as an avenue to justice, the people of Burma and the international community must support other available methods of holding perpetrators of serious crimes accountable. Secretary Clinton’s addition to the chorus of voices calling for the United Nations to establish a Commission of Inquiry is a welcome first step to holding perpetrators of serious crimes accountable.

International attention is rightly focused on Burma leading up to the elections, but our demands for justice and accountability must not end on November 7. By moving forward with the creation of a commission of inquiry the international community can come closer to ensuring justice for the people of Burma.

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Victims Prosecuted or Intimidated But Perpetrators Not Punished

As part of its ongoing campaign to cover up the military’s human rights violations, the government actively discourages complaints regarding military auses by retaliating against anyone who speaks up through victim intimidation tactics, including threatening and or prosecuting victims and witnesses. There is a firmly ingrained culture of impunity for heinous crimes committed by members of the military under the direction or blind eye of the SPDC and the intimidation and prosecution of victims leaves them without recourse and, even more disturbingly, punishes them for the violence they have already suffered.

The commission of heinous crimes and culture of impunity have been most severe in rural ethnic areas and are related to activities surrounding ongoing armed conflict.29 For example, Burmese women’s organizations have documented 875 cases of rape from 1988 to 2006 and believe that number is a me refraction of the total number because of the difficulty in accessing communities under SPDC control and the fear and stigma that keeps women and girls from reporting rape. Many times rape victims have been imprisoned and tortured after making formal complaints or bringing their story to the press.30

Similar patterns have been observed in the cases of forced labor and child soldiering in Burma. The government does not appear to have applied the penal code of military regulations in any child soldiering cases, which could have resulted in imprisonment. Thousands, if not tens of thousands, of child soldiers are believe to be serving in the army; their parents are often silent because reporting these cases to the authorities is often counter-productive. When a researcher for an international organization asked a community leader whether parents report their children’s forced conscription into the army, the man responded that it was too dangerous because local authorities would punish the parents, and the ILO and the UN would be powerless to protect them.31

Thus, the authorities continue to maintain a culture of impunity not only by restricting access to complaints mechanisms, but by harassing and taking legal action against those who bring complaints against the military.

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Police: A Tool For Oppression

Burma Police Manual, Article 1056, provides that the police are obligated to build a cordial and cooperative relationship with the citizenry. They must work together with the people to create a secure society. It is clear that under this Article, the police must not presume that they are somehow superior to ordinary people. Their relationship is no tone of master and servant, or shepherd and sheep. Unfortunately, the current situation in Burma is not consistent with Article 1056. Rather than the collaboration called for in the Manual, many police officers impose their view of law enforcement upon the citizens without receiving any community input. This results in unsafe communities where the police have an adversary relationship with the community members.

Burma Police Manual, Article 1060, provides that police officers cannot have other jobs. Accordingly, any breach of this provision constitutes a criminal offence, punishable three months imprisonment or fine, not more than the amount of three months salaries, or both. This Article seeks to ensure the independence and neutrality of the police force by requiring officers to serve only one master. The current chief of the Burma police, Brigadier Khin Yi, is violating Artile 1060. In addition to his police post, he is also a Brigadier in the army. He must either resign as chief of police or resign from the army. Other countries, even military governments such as Thailand’s, respect the independence of the police. After the recent coup in Thailand, no military official took over the top police position.

Pursuant to Section 32 of Police Act and Section 38 of Rangoon Police Act, any Magistrate or District Superintendent or Assistant or Deputy Superintendent of Police, or Inspector or officer in charge of a police-station, may stop any procession or public assemblies for maintenance of law and order. Nevertheless, it can happen only when the concerned people violate the conditions of a license granted under Section 31 (3) of Police Act and Section37(3) of Rangoon Police contrary to provisions in Police Act, any public procession or assembly shall not be deemed to be an unlawful assembly. As such, any arrest of peaceful demonstrators is unlawful.

The Chapter V of the Code of Criminal Procedures, which is the effective national law in Burma, provides how arrest can be made. Accordingly, arrest without warrant or without an order from a Magistrate can be made for suspects categorized in section 54 of that law. Arrest of innocent civilian who participated in peaceful demonstration, took place in Rangoon on April 22, 2007 was unlawful as it was no in accordance with provisions enshrined in the section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ensuring full compliance with the instructions of the military officials, the police wearing civilian suits made such unlawful arrests.

Burma Police Manual, Article 1142, Chapter 48, Part 1, states that all police must wear their police uniforms while on duty (with exceptions made for positions such as undercover detectives). Brigadier Khin Yi violates this provision of the Manual as well. He always wears his military uniform, even when he is serving the police force. Anyone who sees him knows that he is under the thumb of the SPDC military regime. He wholly lacks the neutrality and independence so important for a police officer, and even worse, the police chief. This master-servant relationship between the SPDC and the Burma police force undermines both the dignity of the profession and the trust that the people have for the police. Understandably, the people of Burma cannot trust a police force that is simply a pawn for the military junta. As such, current position of police in society does not facilitate the emergence and functioning of independent and competent judicial system in Burma. Similar situation will remain the same as the SPDC’s 2008 Constitution does not address this crucial issue relevant to police.

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Prosecutors Are an Extension of the Military Regime

Violations of universally recognized tenets of criminal law and procedure continue during the conduct of criminal trials. In each trial, the state’s case is made by a public prosecutor, a lawyer employed by the state. According to the international standards, a prosecutor must maintain some degree of independence from the governmental apparatus, properly investigate and conduct their functions impartially and without discrimination, and see to it that violations of the law, which do not result in complaining victims, can be brought before the courts.27

This is clearly not the case under the rule of the SPDC. The prosecutor is not accountable to any ethical or professional standards; thus, he has the power to decide not to prosecute cases, no matter how awful the crime or clear the evidence that it occurred as charged, especially if the potential case will shed an unfavorable evidence and witnesses in cases where the state wants to protect the accused member of the military. During criminal trials, many people accused of crimes in Burma reported that they were not allowed to call key witnesses to testify on their behalf. Indeed, in the case of Suu Kyi, the Court allowed only one defense witness. By contrast, the prosecution presented 17. Similarly, in the case of against U Tin Min Htut, who was accused of writing a letter to the United Nations Secretary General in which he criticized the government , a line of police testified for the prosecution but the defendant was unable to present witnesses.28

Thus, the manipulation or disregard of the procedural law in criminal prosecution in Burma renders the international and local requirements for due process meaningless.

Currently in Burma, the police, an important institution to operate a criminal justice system and to support and to support the smooth function of an independent judiciary, have lost its image to stand as a neutral body that treats everyone the same. The whole police institution has been dominated by ex-army and army personnel in its leading role. Police are totally subservient to the military. They dare not take action against the military personnel who commit crime over civilian people.

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Legal Counsel Can’t Perform Adequately

In a well-functioning legal system established under the rule of law, “there must be a recognized, organized and independent legal profession, which is legally empowered and willing to provide legal services.”22

Under the SPDC, lawyers like judges, do not enjoy effective freedom to perform their professional functions. There have been numerous instances of the military intimidating and harassing lawyers, including detaining, arresting and prosecuting a lawyer, or revoking his license on suspicion of his involvement in a politically motivated case. For example, lawyer Saw Kyaw Kyaw Min had been defending 11 clients, all members of the NLD. In late October 2008, a Rangoon court sentenced him to six months in prison under Section 228 of the Burmese Penal Code for contempt of court, forcing him to first spend weeks in hiding and then flee to Thailand. According to the Human Rights Watch report, Saw Kyaw Kyaw’s punishment was for failure to instruct his clients, on the judge’s order, to turn around after his clients turned their backs on the judge to protest the unfair way were being questioned by the prosecution. The report further stated that three other lawyers – Nyi Nyi Htwe, U Aung Thein, and U Khin Maung Shein – were arrested and sentenced to terms of four to six months in prison on the same charges.23

Particularly shocking is the SPDC’s record on retribution involving courageous attorneys who represent victims who suffered human rights abuses at the hands of members of the military, including sexual misconduct, forced labor and child soldiering. Often lawyers are threatened and even arrested for simply taking on such cases. In one such case, on January 19, 2009, lawyer Pho Phyu, who has represented political activists in the past, was arrested shortly after his dismissal by the authorities as defense lawyer for labor activists who were arrested after reporting a case of forced labor by local authorities to the International Labor Organization (“ ILO”). 24

During court proceedings, defense attorneys are usually forced to play a largely symbolic and sinister role in the administration of justice. Although they are permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses, their task is usually limited to striking a deal with the judge to obtain a lenient sentence for their client, often through state-sanctioned bribes. Lawyers who are not prepared to participate in the corrupt court system by paying bribes risk prosecution under the Contempt of Court Act for their alleged improper attitude towards the judges.

Due Process and Fair Trial Guarantees Are Ignored in Practice

Principle 2 of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment states:

Arrest, detention or imprisonment shall only be carried out strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and by competent officials or persons authorized for that purpose.25

Under the SPDC and SLORC’s rule in Burma, however, these important principles of the rule of law are consistently ignored. Although there are concrete procedures for arrest and detention contained in the Burmese Criminal Procedure Code, these are frequently not followed in practice. The arrest and pre-trial detention process often includes arbitrary arrest by military personnel; prolonged interrogation accompanied by torture and ill-treatment; incommunicado pre-trial detention, and the denial of access to lawyers, families, and adequate medical care.

This pattern is particularly evident where persons are arrested on political grounds. Political prisoners are routinely held for periods longer than 24 hours without a warrant or special order from a magistrate, and do not have the opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of their detention before a court. It is common for suspects and detainees to receive no information concerning the charges against them or the legal provisions under which they are brought.

As stated previously, the unlawful detention process often involves the victims’ inability to challenge the legality of their detention with proper legal advice, even though the Judiciary Law Chapter IV, Article 5(f) states that the administration of justice in Burma will be based, in part, on “guaranteeing in all cases the right of defense.” For example, throughout the case of Suu Kyi lawyers are often denied access to courtrooms and in the case of human rights defender U Myint Aye and two co-accused, who were sentenced to life imprisonment for an alleged bombing plot, the first defendant was not represented in court despite his attempts to have a lawyer. His original counsel was also charged and imprisoned in a separate case. 26

Even in circumstances where detainees are permitted to contact a lawyer, widespread poverty and the absence of an effective legal aid system renders this right meaningless in practice. Thus, there is no right to a lawyer in Burma’s judicial system, and accused people are rarely able to obtain their advice and services before or during trial.

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The SPDC Uses The Judiciary To Deprive Citizens of A Rights To A Fair Trial In Order To Suppress Political Dissent

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) recognizes that: Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.” (Article- 10)

The SPDC currently uses the judiciary as a means of suppressing political dissent. Indeed, in a crackdown that started in October 2008, Burma’s courts have sentenced over 200 political and labor activists, internet bloggers, journalists, and Buddhist monks and nuns to lengthy jail terms.14 In 2009, the judiciary sentenced four political activists for the alleged “crimes” of wearing white clothes, calling for Buddhist prayers and organizing a letter-writing campaign to inform the generals of the plight of the people. As a result of their humanitarian actions, the activists had been tortured, spent a year of detention without charge, without access to family and lawyers, had a trial without representation (their lawyers were imprisoned for contempt for trying to represent them) and were sentences for hundreds of years of imprisonment for their supposed crimes. They are representative of thousands of other prisoners wrongfully and inhumanely detained by the Burmese junta.15

Judges Must Enforce SPDC Directives, Including Discriminatory Laws

In many instances, military authorities dictate verdicts in political cases, regardless of the evidence or the law. In addition, the existence of unjust laws--enacted to deprive citizens of universally recognized rights—further restricts the judiciary’s independence, because judges are required to interpret these laws in line with the military dictates by using fabricated evidence.

One such law is the 1975 State Protection Law, which allows the military to preemptively arrest and charge people for crimes that may “endanger the sovereignty and security of the state or public peace and tranquility”- even if they have not yet been committed. This provision has been frequently used by the courts to imprison political opponents of the military junta. For example, the renowned National League for Democracy (“NLD”) leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Suu Kyi was jailed in May 2003 under this arbitrary provision.

Another example is the 2004 Electronic Transaction Law, the purported aims of which are to support modernization, increase opportunities for development in various social sectors, and enable communication with international organizations, regional organizations, foreign countries, government departments. In reality, this law was promulgated by the SPDC in order to charge and sentence political opponents of the military. Specifically, Section 33 of this law outlines “Offences and Penalties” for the misuse of electronic transaction technology including:

(a) Doing any act detrimental to the security of the State or prevalence of law and order or community peace and tranquility or national solidarity or national economy or national culture;

(b) Receiving or sending and distributing any information relating to secrets of the security of the State or prevalence of law and order or community peace and tranquility or national solidarity or national economy or national culture.16

The utilization of the above provisions to prosecute political activists who simply use the internet or mobile phones has become routine. Recently, a supposed violation of this law was used to sentence prominent pro-democracy leader Min Ko Naing, Chairperson of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions and 88 Generation Students group, and nearly forty other dissidents to sixty-five years in prison.17 Similarly, in early January 2009, NLD Chairman Min Aung was sentenced to an additional 15 years of prison under the same act.18

Under Section 505(b) of the archaic Burmese Penal Code, people can be charged for any statement, rumor, or report made “with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquility”.19 The junta has used this law to repress and punish those taking part in free expression, peaceful demonstrations, and forming organizations,20 Most notably, Section 505(b) was used in-part to charge U Gambira, leader of the All Burma Monks’ Alliance and key activist in the 2007 Saffron Revolution – a peaceful protest – with a total of 68 years in prison.21

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In Promoting Human Rights And The Rule of Law

Judiciary in Burma

The Role of Judiciary

In Promoting Human Rights And The Rule of Law

In Burma, the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has institutionalized human rights abuses through what has been commonly characterized as Burma's "injustice system." Arbitrary arrests and unlawful prosecutions, used by the regime to silence its critics and discriminate against ethnic minorities and women, are perpetuated by the states judiciary, which serves merely as "an appendage of executive authority."

The Independent and Impartial Judiciary:

The Foundation for the Rule of Law

In the realm of human development, one of the core principles and drivers of economic growth, political modernization and the protection of human rights is the rule of law – a legal-political regime under which the law restrains the government by promoting certain liberties and crating order and predictability regarding how a country functions. In the most basic sense, it is a system that protects the rights of citizens from arbitrary and abusive use of government power and has the effect of furthering democracy.

Since its inception, the SPDC promised to usher in a functioning democracy, including and August 2003 announcement of a seven-step road map towards a democratic transition. Thus, it has a duty to establish and promote the rule of law as an indispensable part of its legal-political system. Indeed, as a state party to the Geneva Conventions and as a UN member state, the government in Burma has had an ongoing international legal obligation to protect its civilian by, among other things, a politically independent and impartial judiciary, an institution which is crucial to the establishment of the rule of law. It is necessary for resolving disputes among citizens as well as between citizens and the government in an unbiased, transparent, predictable and interpretive methodology. Political independence is achieved through the separation of powers, which ensures that the courts are respected by all parties to the dispute, especially by the government itself.

1947 Constitution and Burma's Judiciary

With independence of Burma, 1947 constitution came into force and that was landmark in Burma's journey to democracy. The judicial system was based on Common Law tradition. The Union Judiciary Act governed the judiciary. The main difference was the establishment of the Supreme Court, as the Highest Court of the land. It was the Court of final appeals but the feature of the system was that it was vested with powers to enforce fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution. Burma's Judiciary then was independent and impartial and separation of powers was practice.

1974 Constitution and Burmas Judiciary

In the aftermath of the 1962 military coup, the judiciary lost its independence. Then the military regime applied 1974 constitution and people's judicial system was created. Accordingly, separation of powers was no longer practiced in accordance with the constitution.

Burma's Judiciary after 1988 Military Coup

Following the 1988 popular democratic uprisings, the military staged a coup again in September 18, 1988. Then, the Constitution was abolished and judiciary has been instituted under its total control. Judiciary Law 5/2000 (the "Judiciary Law"), implemented by the SPDC in 2000, provides the framework for the current legal system. Although under the Judiciary Law the judiciary is charged with "administering justice independently according to law," (emphasis added), the Judiciary Law undermines, if not eliminates, the separation of powers and leaves the civil society in Burma with no legitimate means of challenging the executive authority.

Burma's Judiciary and Independence Issue

From judicial aspect, "independence" issue has never been placed for debate in any public meeting or media or law schools or otherwise. Particularly, independence from executive is an untouchable topic for all legal communities and academicians who are knowledgeable, while it is unfamiliar with the general public who do not have enough knowledge on judicial norms. The principle, "Administering justice independently according to law," provide not only in Judicial Law 2000 but also in Article 19(a) of the 2008 constitution, does not actually guarantee institutional independence of judiciary. In today's Burma, judiciary does not exist as an independent institution, while the judicial proceedings themselves are also not independent in practice.

The Judiciary Law 2000

The Judiciary Law 2000 has no provision for how judges are to be appointed, how they can be removed, or their conditions of service. These matters are not provided in any other current law or constitution in Burma, and so are left to the military’s discretion. All appointments and dismissal were made only at the whim of ruling junta freely without publicizing any ground, consulting with the legal community, and receiving any suggestion from elected representatives. The current Chief Justice was appointed by the military in 1998. This was done by a military decree, which also effectively dismissed over 60 judges. On November 14, 1998, the SPDC “permitted to retire” to five, out of six judges in the Supreme Court, without providing any reason for their resignations and the vacant positions were replaced with four judges. The possibility of 80% of the Supreme Court judiciary simultaneously retiring is so unlikely that the event raises questions as to the independence and autonomy of Burma’s judiciary.

Then, on July 1999, another six judges were added 13 and then total number of Supreme Court judges was eleven. Since then on, no news was officially released by the junta that any one or more of Supreme Court judges were dismissed or forced to resign repeatedly. After that, in February 2003; more five judges were appointed and as such total number of Supreme Court judges was 16. It was against the existing Judicial Law 2000; because, total number of Supreme Court judges to be appointed in total are twelve. All the processes for appointment and dismissal of Supreme Court are done at the whim of junta. The term “judicial tenure” is mockery for the current judiciary in Burma. Furthermore, there is no judges’ association to protect the security of judicial tenure.

It is clear that the military regime has no tolerance for independent judges. Judges that seek to perform their judicial duties as impartial adjudicators cognizant of the democratic separation of powers are typically dismissed while others bow to pressure from the military to retain their appointments. As to the removal of judges at lower levels, it is difficult for international observers to know how bad the situation is, as this information is kept from the international community.

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Advanced Course on International Law and Human Rights: The Human Rights Dimension of Environmental Protection

Traditionally, environmental protection originated from the desire to protect the environment inasmuch as it was useful for humankind (anthropocentric approach). As the environmental movement gained prominence, however, scholars have attempted to move away from this utilitarian model and have started to consider the protection of the environment as an end in itself (ecocentric approach). Arguably, in order to make the link between human rights and the environment, however, requires the adoption of a more anthropocentric stance. There can be no human right to a healthy environment unless the environment can be regarded as a tool for human welfare and realization, in addition to recognizing the inherent value of the environment.

This seminar is aimed at evaluating the relationships between human rights and environmental protection. International environmental law has achieved a large measure of success in many aspects, and one of them is precisely the transformation of environmental issues as human rights concerns. This transformation is of great assistance to the environmental movement, as it gains the aid of a very powerful rhetoric, and also puts a human face to the issue. To the extent that environmental degradation affects a human right, it becomes a more pressing issue, and is more readily and efficiently addressed by law and policy. To the extent that human rights impact on the environment, the moral and political foundation of environmental protection is reinforced by the universal message of human rights.

However, many questions surround the relationship between environmental quality and human rights, starting from the fundamental question of the validity of such a connection. This is always a question to be borne in mind during the sessions of this seminar, but, as far as the structuring of the course is concerned, it will be taken as a given that the anthropocentric approach is the dominant one, while recognizing that the inherent value of the environment is an important component of the debate. Among the many questions to be dealt with in this seminar are: biodiversity, indigeneity and rights; access to environmental justice; information and participation rights; heritage and environment; desertification and climate change; the right to water; the links between human rights, trade, human rights and the environment, and pollution and human rights. These areas by no means exhaust the topic, but rather must be seen as case studies and springboards for further reflection on this mutually reinforcing relationship.

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